Education and Autonomy

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"Hope...I understand above all as a state of mind, not a state of the world....it is a

dimension of the soul...an orientation of the spirit, an orientation of the heart..."

Vaclav Havel (Havel, 181)

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Introduction

Rudolf Steiner's advocacy of "education toward freedom" is probably unique among educational philosophies. There have been many other pedagogues and educational philosophers who have espoused freedom in schools, of course, assuming that children could be expected to be free, autonomous individuals and attempting to construct schools around this assumption, making freedom central to education's *context*. Steiner's unique achievement was to turn this around, setting the free, autonomous individual as a developmental *aim* for the school. Emerson and Goethe may be considered to have been philosophical forerunners of this approach.

The specifically pedagogical principle of education toward freedom can be better understood in the context of the central place of freedom in Steiner's larger worldview; indeed, he titled his fundamental philosophical work, Die Philosophie der Freiheit. Steiner's usage of the term "Freiheit", or freedom, refers to a quality of (inner) activity, however, a quality to a certain extent independent of the outer circumstances in which this activity takes place. "Freedom is nothing absolute. It always depends on the inner activity of the individual himself." (Carlgren, 203, and cf. the section "Freedom", below.) This is in some senses contrary to the usual modern meaning of "freedom", which is largely concerned with an absence of outer restrictions.

In fact, Steiner mentioned that his understanding of freedom – an understanding which has its roots in German transcendental philosophy – would be particularly alien to

the English-speaking world. In English, the word *freedom* contains the Old English root *dôm*, meaning a condition or state, and thus explicitly emphasizes the outer situation within which one exists.

Steiner thus asked that "Philosophie der Freiheit" be translated into English metaphorically as "Philosophy of Spiritual Activity", instead of literally as "Philosophy of Freedom", in order for the work to be understood properly by English-speaking readers. Perhaps what Steiner meant by spiritual activity is also possible to construe as "inwardly creative activity":

> Will man daher von der menschlichen Freiheit reden, so muß man auf
>
> dieses Autonome im Menschen sehen, auf das reine, sinnlichkeitsfreie
>
> Denken, in dem immer auch der Wille lebt.[i]
>
> Rudolf Steiner (1992, 51)[1]

Thus, we can best understand Steiner's concept of an education toward freedom when we comprehend freedom not as a static state, not as something it is possible to possess, but as a dynamic potential, as something we can become or practice (Carlgren, 1975).

This essay will explore freedom as an educational aim further (see Part II). But to understand the concept of education toward freedom, it is not sufficient that we understand what freedom is. It is also necessary that we understand the nature of education itself – of what it means to foster the development of not yet mature human

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[1] Note: All quotations in languages other than English are translated in the endnotes; see the concluding section, *Translations*.

beings. This essay will thus seek to examine 1) the nature of the educational task *per se*, as well as the various goals that have been put forward for education historically; 2) the nature of freedom; and 3) the relationship of freedom to traditional educational goals.

A future essay should then examine the pedagogical methodology (what Steiner would call the moral technique) of education toward freedom, or how freedom and autonomy can be schooled, with examples from the current practice of schools that nurture this as a pedagogical goal. The social requisites for an education toward freedom would also have to be considered in this regard, i.e., to what extent there is a relationship between education's socio-political context and the education possible within that context, in particular as regards education toward freedom.

Part I

The Essence of Education

What is education? Many educators would probably feel uncomfortable about giving a clearly defined answer to this fundamental question. There has also been no historical consensus on this subject, various answers having been proposed by various pedagogues and at various times. Yet so long as educators are unclear about their task's nature and aims, they cannot be expected to be effective in their work. Further, in so far as educators may be clear, yet partially – or even wholly – mistaken about education's true nature and proper aims, their teaching can only be expected to be effective in ways that are at best tangentially related to, and at worst working directly contrary to its actual nature and purpose: "With our mistaken notions, the further we advance, the further we go astray." (Rousseau, 1911, 1)

In seeking to understand the fundamental task of education, we will especially want to consider its special connection with childhood, that period of life when:

1) There is an innate flexibility and receptivity which allow rapid physical, emotional and intellectual development to take place. This development shapes the groundwork upon which are founded all later capacities in these realms;

2) The human being is not yet capable of directing his or her life and development autonomously, but is dependent upon others for this direction; and

3) The individual's ultimate developmental direction is not yet apparent.

Drawing a contrast between education in childhood and adult education will aid our considerations here. To distinguish these two properly is especially important in our time, when it is increasingly common for some form of education to extend beyond childhood proper.

For many people today, higher education continues as the dominant focus of their lives well into their twenties and even thirties. It also increasingly accompanies people throughout their lives in a more subordinate role in the form of continuing education, adult learning, independent courses and workshops. Nevertheless, there are significant differences between education directed toward children and that directed toward adults.

Inverting the fundamental characteristics of childhood mentioned above brings out both the advantages and challenges of adult education. What is a challenge in childhood – the inability to depend upon the child's capacity for self-direction – becomes an advantage in adulthood in the form of a comparatively advanced capacity for self-direction, while what is an advantage in childhood – a ready capacity for development – becomes a challenge in adulthood in the form of a loss of flexibility and the corresponding greatly increased difficulty in learning new skills. In addition, as adulthood progresses the ultimate developmental direction becomes increasingly apparent, and thus adult education can often be highly specialized and focused in its aim, whereas the education of children must allow for a wide range of possible future directions.

Adult education is correspondingly oriented toward, and often dependent upon, students' self-direction; to be fully effective, adult education must be self-chosen, self-

motivated and even self-evaluated. "From a psychological point of view, the problem of education reduces itself, in the case of adults, to the problem of self-knowledge and rational self-direction." (Adler, 1930, 3) Adult education might thus better be termed facilitated learning or facilitated self-education to bring out the contrast to the education of children, where teaching rather than facilitation, and guidance from outside rather than self-direction, are necessarily primary.

It is easy to confuse these two modes. Carl Rogers, for example, probably one of the great adult educators of his time, declared that the role of teachers of children should be limited to being facilitators of self-directed learning (Rogers, 1960). Indeed, a major stream of contemporary education has emphasized treating children as capable of self-direction – treating them, in many ways, as miniature adults. Often this failed miserably. Where it worked, the self-direction was often an illusion. In O'Neill's Summerhill, for example, by giving up all outer authority, the powerful personality that O'Neill undoubtedly embodied achieved yet greater *inner* authority in the eyes of the children, as well as of many adults. This was a magnificent pedagogical achievement, yet O'Neill's direction of the school was not any less merely because he avoided all outward coercion. In fact, Summerhill's rapid decline after O'Neill's death clearly illustrates how much of the school's success depended on his presence and the direction he was able to give the children, and the school generally, in a non-authoritarian manner.

Thus, when considering childhood, we will here distinguish between *self-direction* and *non-authoritarian direction*. To put it starkly, the child's self is simply not yet capable of providing direction to the child from within; if it were, education as we

know it would be superfluous, and children would be but physically smaller adults. A philosopher discussing the development of autonomous personality put it this way:

> …young children do not seem to have real selves – they do not, or not
>
> yet, have valuational systems, as distinguished from a mere set of
>
> desires, and so there is no possibility that their actions can be in
>
> accordance with them. (Wolf, 34)

Realistically, to accomplish the transition from the extreme pole of helplessness, rapid growth and total receptivity represented by the earliest period of childhood to the maturity of the self-directed, accomplished adult, a process of development must take place. Elements of the latter pole, of the developmental goal, must, however, be prepared by, and eventually begin to be included in at least tentative form in the developmental process if these elements are to be ready to be consolidated in a stable form in adulthood. In order for the transition from childhood to adulthood to be an assisted continuum rather than a crisis of abandonment, it must be carefully crafted.

Historically, we can see the stages of a craftsman's path toward independence – apprentice (receptivity and complete dependence), journeyman (exploration, tentative incorporation of elements of freedom and self-direction with extensive support) and master (full recognition of the individual's developed capacities and independence) – as such a consciously directed transition. In our times, the traditional modes of work on which the guilds were based have nearly disappeared, as have the guilds themselves. Given this and the many other radical differences between medieval times and the present day, it is apparent that new solutions to this problem must be found. Nevertheless, one

central goal of education remains the facilitation of this transition: to progressively encourage the human being to develop toward the state of maturity and self-direction characteristic of the autonomous individual.

A second responsibility of education follows from the malleability of the human form and faculties in childhood, and the inevitable loss of this naturally malleable condition in adulthood. The capacities available in adulthood – capacities, for example, of practical action and perception, of feeling and expression, of social integration, of understanding, and of creativity – are significantly, though by no means completely, determined by the groundwork laid down by the child's development during the first twenty-one years of life:

> When as a mature adult a person can take upon himself the
> responsibility for his own further development, then the capabilities
> and resources at his disposal are largely dependent upon the efforts
> made throughout his childhood years by his parents and teachers.
> (Carlgren, 203)

It is thus a common experience that in adulthood, fundamental capacities can only be built up at the cost of great and enduring efforts, require the commitment of rarely available energies and time, and in the end are often less deeply anchored than the experiences and accomplishments of childhood. This is especially apparent in the case of certain abilities. For example, a young child acquires its mother tongue – or, placed in a new setting, a second or third language – within an incredibly brief span of time, simultaneously acquiring the grammar, vocabulary and perfect pronunciation. Few who

begin to learn a new language as adults can achieve such accent-free fluency, even after many years of immersion or study. Similarly, it would be remarkable indeed for someone to begin learning a musical instrument as an adult and to achieve a virtuoso or even merely a high professional standard of play, whereas there are numerous fifteen, twelve or even ten-year-old virtuosi on the musical scene. The same holds true for other skills – drawing, for example, and literacy. Indeed, even such apparently innate abilities as three-dimensional vision are difficult or impossible to acquire in adulthood in the case of people born blind and whose sight is restored in adulthood. (Gregory, 1963; von Senden, 1960)

A great deal of the modern pressure on education stems from an awareness of the importance of an early start for achievement in any field. Educators who attempt to resist this trend toward accelerated learning can hardly expect to be taken seriously in the present-day pedagogical discussion unless they can show that the secret of eventual accomplishment lies not in bringing later stages forward, but in establishing firm early foundations and making systematic progress through the intermediate stages essential to final mastery. The assertion that early learning is not essential is not only weak in the context of such experiences as the above, it is also – in the sense of the developmental stages indicated here – mistaken. If the argument is not to be lost before the discussion has properly begun, the question will not be *whether* to provide early learning experiences, but rather *which* early learning experiences to provide.

There is a responsibility to develop potentials only available during childhood so that the adult can make use of these in the course of life. As society becomes more complex and as more and more people are engaged in activities essentially unnatural to

childhood, the normal course of children's lives (i.e., their lives outside of the special environment of the school) seems ever less adequately to meet children's developmental needs and possibilities. Thus, one of the primary justifications of education's increasingly great role in children's lives over the last few centuries is to take the place of other areas of life in nurturing children's development.

The above considerations are given here as a foundation in order to consider later the special role of freedom in childhood and education. This role can only be understood when it is clear that the child is *not* by nature independent and self-directed, but rather dependent and developing under external guidance. True freedom can only exist where there is independence and self-direction – where there is an inwardly autonomous individual. In this sense, a child cannot *be* free; a child can only *become* free.

The Aims of Education

Great public debates about education have often swung around contrary conceptions of education's aims and purposes. Such conceptions may be spoken of directly or may lie implicit beneath discourse about such things as the evaluative methods that should be applied to judge the progress of pupils or the effectiveness of schools.

The actual educational approach applied in any setting is generally justified, and can always be understood, with reference to particular aims or purposes. Some educational approaches clearly emphasize a more particular and narrower set of aims and purposes, while others are more broad and universal in their intention and/or realization. Thus, we may posit the following questions:

> ➤ Are the various aims and purposes put forward for education mutually compatible?
>
> ➤ Is it possible to establish, or at least to aim at and work toward, an educational approach that seeks to promote the harmony of all of these, rather than to emphasize one at the expense of others?
>
> ➤ What is the relationship of Steiner education's goal of developing the free individuality to the traditional goals propounded for education, taken separately or all together?

We will begin here with a representative survey of the kinds of aims that have been put forward for education.

Basic Skills and Knowledge

The most basic goal of education is the acquisition of the skills and knowledge fundamental to a discipline. Thus, a certain level of achievement in the three R's – reading, writing and arithmetic – is often considered to be essential to a modern education. Certain information regarded as vital to a rudimentary comprehension of various subjects may complement this: in history, the dates of decisive battles or the succession of rulers; in geography, the names, location and capitals of countries or states; in astronomy, the names and order of the planets.

Surely, for many pupils, teachers and school systems, such skill practice and knowledge acquisition is the primary stuff of education, both the daily battle and – at least *de facto* – the overall goal. It is correspondingly often not the philosophers, but those closest to the day-to-day realities of teaching who remind us that "writing a sentence, speaking clearly, playing the piano, or learning inferential statistics, is simply difficult work." These are the words, written in 1974, of a member of a team that evaluated open classrooms in New York State. (Quoted in Ravitch, 2000, 401)

The evaluative technique typically employed for such learning is the graded test. Test scores, however, easily pass from a method of evaluation to an aim in themselves. This is true for the pupil, the teacher –"The prospect of final examination may be falsifying not only the work of the students, but even that of the teachers as well." (Piaget 1965) – as well as for society generally. In England, for example, great fuss is made over the yearly "league tables", which are government statistics published in the national newspapers that rank every school in the country, public or private, according to the scores achieved by its pupils that year in certain uniform national tests. In Europe

generally, pupils' ability to score well on evaluative tests chiefly determines admission even into the various strands of secondary education (apprenticeship or practical training, a middle level of schooling, or preparation for university), while in both Europe and America university admissions are strongly determined by such performance. In the United States, however, where test scores have in any case traditionally been only one factor – albeit often enough a decisive one – in influencing admissions, there is now a growing reaction on the university level against the dominance of testing, or at least of conventional standardized testing, in applicant selection. This reaction is even appearing inside some of the educational institutions themselves. A contrary movement can be seen in primary and secondary education, however, where testing is becoming more and more standardized and being applied earlier and earlier.

Testing in schools is often oriented toward the evaluation of what has just been taught, of short-term learning rather than long-term retention; thus the phenomenon of "cramming". The challenge of evaluating what is recalled in later life of what was taught in school is that this can only be judged long after the learning has taken place – long after the pupil has left school and childhood behind. To test adults as we do school children is not only difficult, and often inappropriate;[2] except in certain exceptional cases (e.g. where schooling in a given subject only occurred over a very specific and limited period), it is also virtually impossible to correlate what is revealed by such tests with

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[2] It may be inappropriate to test school children in this way as well, but they are generally powerless either to resist, or even to articulate their feelings of inappropriateness. Adults are capable of both.

specific learning experiences in childhood. Conclusions about the long-term effectiveness of educational experiences are thus notoriously difficult to draw.

Beyond developing basic skills and passing on information, teachers may aim to deepen the pupils' understanding through the content brought. A higher level of education may aim for the acquisition of a certain cultural breadth. For example, Robert Maynard Hutchins of the University of Chicago wished all college students to be familiar with the world's great books, from whence the Great Books program arose. Learning for learning's sake implies that the act of learning itself is lasting and worthwhile for the learner, independent of any utilitarian advantage that may also accrue thereby.

Critiques of an emphasis on learned content often emphasize that this approach ignores the learner – the child – in its single-minded interest in the material to be learned:

> The wisest writers devote themselves to what a man ought to know,
> without asking what a child is capable of learning. They are always
> looking for the man in the child, without considering what he is before
> he becomes a man. (Rousseau, 1911)

Thus, many pedagogical approaches focus on developing aspects of the human being that are not purely knowledge-oriented, and thus not as readily quantitatively testable. It will be useful to consider two large groupings here, according to whether the pedagogical emphasis is on utilitarian or humanistic concerns. We will examine three of the chief utilitarian streams – economic, social and religious or moral utility – and three of the chief humanist streams – classic humanism, free schools and developmental approaches.

Economic Utility

Perhaps the most frequently cited of the utilitarian approaches, especially in the United States, is concerned with the economic utility of education. This approach sees that effective, practical, career-oriented schooling can promote either pupils' future capacity to find employment at the highest status, salary, or functional level; the economic success of the society as a whole; or both together. Included here are the movements for industrial and vocational education, for example.

> The fundamental conception of career education is that all educational experiences, curriculum, instruction and counseling should be geared to preparing each individual for a life of economic independence, personal fulfillment and an appreciation for the dignity of work. (Spring, 1990, 355-6)

It was in this sense that life adjustment was emphasized in American education in the 1940s and 1950s. This was a focus on preparing children to "fit into society as it then was" and to "train each student for the specific job he was likely to hold". (Ravitch, 2000, 377)

Social Integration

It has not only been the life adjustment educational movement that has seen education to be essential to the development of social integration, or of good citizenship and civic leadership. Even Rousseau, generally noted for his liberal standpoint on education, gave distinct support to the idea that

In the social order where each has his own place a man must be

educated for it…. [A person's] education is only useful when fate

agrees with his parent's choices; if not, education harms the scholar, if

only by the prejudices it has created. (Rousseau, 9)

Thomas Jefferson was eloquent on the subject:

And whereas it is generally true that people will be happiest whose

laws are best, and are best administered, and that laws will be wisely

formed, and honestly administered, in proportion as those who form

and administer them are wise and honest; whence it becomes expedient

for promoting the publick happiness that those persons, whom nature

hath endowed with genius and virtue, should be rendered by liberal

education worthy to receive, and able to guard the sacred deposit of the

rights and liberties of their fellow citizens…(Jefferson, 233)

While Piaget could introduce an essay on "The New Methods of Education" with
the proposition that:

To educate is to adapt the child to an adult social environment, in other

words, to change the individual's psychobiological constitution in

terms of the totality of the collective realities to which the community

consciously attributes a certain value. (Piaget, 137)

In the same vein, one of W. E. B. DuBois's chief arguments for Negro education
was that, by channeling individuals' energy into the society rather than against it,

rebellious conditions are avoided and productive contributions to the civic good can be expected. (DuBois, 64-6)

The post-Sputnik attempts of American education to create a new generation of scientists in order to catch up with what was perceived as a Soviet edge in technology exemplify a perhaps typically American balance between civic duty and career orientation. Not the economic, but the civic contribution of the professional training was emphasized here (though economic benefits were also made generously available to those entering scientific careers).

The above examples are essentially conservative in nature, as they see in education a method of ensuring a stable social order and the integration of the new generation into existing social structures. There is also a progressive counterpart to this approach, which sees in education a vehicle for social change. In the United States, for example, improving race relations has been one of the main focuses of society's interest in the educational system.

John Holt characterized the extent to which the United States has viewed its schools as means to social ends by quoting the following editorial column that appeared in the Boston Globe newspaper:

> The United States has imposed on its public schools the burden of overcoming its race history. Why it should be this way is not at all clear.
>
> One might say it follows from an American tendency to make education the institution of reform.

Holt points out that "the idea that the schools are incubators for reform, the seedbed of a better world, is firmly believed by many schoolmen and defenders of schooling," and contrasts this with the belief, firmly rooted in the very same "schoolmen and defenders', that schools "are needed to get children ready for reality." Holt takes a pessimistic view of the latter goal: "Perhaps at one time and for some children schools may have done this work. They can't do it now." (Holt, 256-7)

Religious and Moral Development

A third variety of what we might call educational utilitarianism has seen in education a tool for religious, ethical or moral development. Frederick Froebel, for example, writing at the close of the nineteenth century, stated that:

> Education consists in leading man, as a thinking, intelligent being, growing into self-consciousness, to a pure and unsullied, conscious and free representation of the inner law of Divine Unity, and in teaching him ways and means thereto.

Froebel found an inner harmony between religion and destiny:

> It is the destiny and life-work of all things to unfold their essence, hence their divine being, and, therefore, the Divine Unity itself – to reveal God in their external and transient being. (Froebel, 1 and 4)

Sometimes the emphasis lies on transmitting important values or a central ideal through all aspects of education:

An adult who has charge of a child transmits to him that which seems

most apt to form his body, his mind and his religious faith in light of a

well-defined ideal of life. (Riché, Preface)

Religious utilitarianism in education has been especially visible in periods of

religious revivalism, naturally (Edwards, 1959), but that it plays a significant role even in

our fairly secular times can be seen by the continuing popularity of denominational

schools. The latter's client base surely has a complex mix of motives for choosing such

schools, but certainly prominent among these motives is a desire to give children a

religious or moral foundation for life.

There have been utilitarian generalists who consider all of the above-mentioned

aspects – economic utility, social or civic integration, and religious or moral development

– to be integral to education's purpose. In his Twelfth and final Annual Report, for

example, Horace Mann characterized all three of these aspects clearly and at length as

essential to education:

Education, then, beyond all other devices of human origin, is the great

equalizer of the conditions of men – the balance wheel of the social

machinery…. it gives each man the independence and the means, by

which he can resist the selfishness of other men. It does better than to

disarm the poor of their hostility toward the rich; it prevents being

poor.

Had the obligations of the future citizen been sedulously inculcated

upon all the children of this Republic, would the patriot have had to

mourn over so many instances, where the voter, not being able to

accomplish his purpose by voting, has proceeded to accomplish it by

violence…. Thus, may all the children of the Commonwealth receive

instruction in the great essentials of political knowledge…

I hold it, then, to be one of the excellences, one of the moral beauties of

the Massachusetts system, that there is one place in the land, where the

children of all the different denominations are brought together for

instruction, where the Bible is allowed to speak for itself; – one place,

where the children can kneel at a common altar, and feel that they have

a common Father and where the services of religion tend to create

brothers, and not Ishmaelites. (Mann, 1848)

Humanism

Distinct from both content-oriented learning and a utilitarian orientation is the

humanistic standpoint that education's real purpose is to develop pupils' innate

capacities. Perhaps the direction of the humanitarian approach can best be summed up in

the words of Maria Montessori:

Education should no longer be mostly imparting knowledge, but must

take a new path, seeking the release of human potentialities.

(Montessori, 1-2)

Humanistic education generally emphasizes the uniqueness of each individuality and is oriented toward helping each unfold potentialities, capacities and life goals from within, rather than implanting or directing these from outside. A contrast is often pointedly made here between *education*, derived from the Latin "educare", the drawing out of capacities inherent in the child, and *teaching*, e.g., showing or instructing, seen as filling the child with knowledge:

> Narration (with the teacher as narrator) leads the students to memorize mechanically the narrated content. Worse yet, it turns them into "containers,' into "receptacles" to be "filled" by the teacher. The more completely she fills the receptacles, the better a teacher she is. The more meekly the receptacles permit themselves to be filled, the better students they are. (Freire, 52f)

Ralph Waldo Emerson expressed the humanist viewpoint eloquently:

> I believe that our experience instructs us that the secret of Education lies in respecting the pupil. It is not for you to choose what he shall know, what he shall do. It is chosen and foreordained, and he only holds the key to his own secret. By your tampering and thwarting and too much governing he may be hindered from his end and kept out of his own. Respect the child. (Emerson, 217)

while ensuring that a balanced approach was emphasized:

> Respect the child, respect him to the end, but also respect yourself. Be the companion of his thought, the friend of his friendship, the lover of

his virtue, – but no kinsman of his sin. Let him find you so true to

yourself that you are the irreconcilable hater of his vice and the

imperturbable slighter of his trifling.

The two points in a boy's training are, to keep his naturel and train off

all but that: – to keep his naturel, but stop off his uproar, fooling and

horse-play; – keep his nature and arm it with knowledge in the very

direction in which it points. Here are the two capital facts, Genius and

Drill. (Emerson, 217)

The individualistic tone of the humanistic approach often appears to contrast

sharply with traditionalists' emphasis on what a person can contribute to society through

the economy or the civic sphere, and with integration into an established religious

framework, and even more sharply with skills or content-based teaching. In America, the

humanistic viewpoint gained substantial respectability from the 1893 report of the

Committee of Ten, which recommended that the quality of education should be

independent of the pupils' likely future occupations, and from the work of John Dewey.

This focus on individual development rather than social contribution has

stimulated some criticism of humanistic education as excessively narcissistic. (Ravitch,

2000, Chap. 10) A certain humanistic realism can embrace the cultivation of the

economic, civic or especially the religious life as an aim of education while absorbing

these in what it would consider a higher purpose, however. Froebel, for example, led his

emphasis on religious life into an insightful differentiation of the principle, practice and

object of education:

…to guide thinking, intelligent beings in the apprehension of their life-

work and in the accomplishment of their destiny, is the theory of

education. The self-active application of this knowledge in the direct

development and cultivation of rational beings toward the attainment of

their destiny, is the practice of education. The object of education is the

realization of a faithful, pure, inviolate and hence holy life. (Froebel, 3-

4)

Similarly, the best examples of utilitarianism already verge on a humanistic

approach in that they see in the ability to find useful and appropriate employment, in

social and civic integration or in the cultivation of a religious, moral life, practical

necessities that enable an individual to fulfill his or her potential or destiny. We can see

this in the case of Horace Mann, who undoubtedly saw education in a higher light than

the utilitarian emphasis of much of his writing would indicate. "To what extent can the

resources and powers of nature be converted into human welfare; the peaceful arts of life

be advanced; and the vast treasures of human talent and genius be developed?" (Mann,

42) (It should be noted that the context of this quotation is an emphatically utilitarian

one.) Nevertheless, American public education, whose outward character was so largely

formed by Mann's principles, may never have quite recognized Mann's greater vision.

Free Schools

Beyond respecting the individuality of the child, free schools seek to respect and

enhance the autonomy of the child, avoiding exerting undue influence on the natural

impulses of childhood. The free school movement may be said to have had its origin with

Rousseau, who urged that "the natural man', the untarnished, sinless, perfect original nature of the human being, be respected and cultivated, and warned that education, and upbringing generally, tend to spoil the uninhibited purity of the natural being of the child. (Rousseau, 1911)

Rousseau's philosophy was more complex than this, but this one aspect was frequently taken up by reformers ranging from Pestalozzi to Robert Owen, and much of the free school movement of our time traces its origin back to Rousseau.

Summerhill, mentioned above, is perhaps the classic example of the free school. There, pupils as young as eight-years old sat together with older pupils and teachers to decide all details of the school's life in democratic forum. The pupils also chose the extent to which they would participate in classes. ("Offerings" might be a more appropriate term than classes, given the voluntary nature of all lessons).

Paulo Freire is a special case, as he advocated freedom as a developmental aim rather than merely as a pedagogical context. Though his method seeks to achieve liberation through education, it is of limited relevance to this study for two reasons. First, his approach is highly specific to situations of political oppression. Second, his methods are primarily oriented toward and suitable for awakening already autonomous individuals, i.e. adults, to their condition of autonomy, rather than developing the preconditions for autonomy in not yet autonomous individuals, i.e., children. (See the discussions of autonomy both in the introduction and below.)

Developmental Approaches

The expectation of the free schools that children are capable of exercising full autonomy has much in common with the view that children are capable of developing into individuals capable of exercising full autonomy. The difference lies in the awareness of and emphasis on the developmental process that leads to autonomy. This brings us to another branch of the humanistic approach to education, developmentally based education, which views the aim of education as centered in meeting the changing needs of the human being over the course of childhood. Seeing in childhood a series of stages or a developmental path, this approach naturally distinguishes between childhood and adulthood, while seeking to comprehend the journey that leads from the one to the other, and thus approaches some of the questions posed at the beginning of this essay.

A developmental understanding of childhood can be traced back at least to Hippocrates, who characterized three stages of childhood in his work De Hebdomadis: that of *paidion*, up to age seven; *pais*, from seven to fourteen years; and *meirakion* or *meirax*, from fourteen to twenty-one years of age (Cubberley, 1948). Pestalozzi, the educational philosopher and practitioner, Piaget, the empirical psychologist, and Steiner, the humanist researcher, are perhaps the foremost modern voices here. Pestalozzi characterized his approach as follows:

> Sound education stands before me symbolized by a tree planted near
> fertilizing waters. A little seed, which contains the design of the tree,
> its form and proportions, is placed in the soil. See how it germinates
> and expands into trunk, branches, leaves, flowers and fruit. The whole
> tree is an uninterrupted chain of organic parts, the plan of which

existed in its seed and root. Man is similar to the tree. In the new-born

child are hidden those faculties which are to unfold during life. The

individual and separate organs of his being form themselves gradually

into unison, and build up humanity in the image of God. (Quoted in

Downs, 79)

A significant influence on American education has been attributed to Pestalozzi:

…Pestalozzian ideas came to the U.S., at first largely through English

sources, and after about 1860, resulted in a thorough reorganization of

American elementary education. (Cubberley, 546)

It could be questioned to what extent this transmission included Pestalozzi's

developmental ideas, which were quite advanced:

The development of man he believed to be organic, and to proceed

according to law. It was the work of the teacher to discover these laws

of development and to assist nature in securing "a natural, symmetrical

and harmonious development" of all the faculties of the child. Real

education must develop the child as a whole – mentally, physically,

morally – and called for the training of the head and the hand and the

heart. (Cubberley, 542)

and to what extent it was rather his positivism that shaped American education:

I have fixed the highest supreme principle of instruction in the

recognition of <u>sense impressions as the absolute foundation of all</u>

knowledge. (Pestalozzi, <u>How Gertrude Teaches Her Children</u>, quoted

in Cubberley, 546)

Piaget's fundamental contribution was in the careful observation of child development and in describing the developmental stages that he observed. It is interesting that these developmental stages, of sensorimotor, concrete, and formal operations, correspond chronologically quite closely to Hippocrates' stages of childhood.

Steiner also proposed a fundamental division of childhood into three phases, and described in great detail the developmental characteristics and pedagogical requirements of each phase. The fundamental principle of his view of child development is that in the first seven years, the young child lives through the will in the world of sense experience (Piaget's sensorimotor phase); in the next seven years (Piaget's phase of concrete operations) the child lives in feeling in the world of imagination; in the final seven years, the youth develops the capacity through abstract thought to work in the world practically (Piaget's stage of formal operations). Like Pestalozzi, Steiner emphasized the importance of a balanced development of head, heart and hand, attributing to each developmental phase the principle role in laying the foundation for one of these: early childhood serving to develop the practical skills of the hand; the middle years developing the heart or life of feeling; and adolescence developing the head or intellectual life. (Steiner, 1965) Or, in the words of one of the earliest Americans to be interested in Steiner's impulse in education:

Past generations of teachers spoke of education as a means of

"preparing the child for life'. Modern educators…state their objective

differently: it is "to give children meaningful experience at every age."

(Spock, 1978, 13)

To this developmental emphasis, Steiner brings a central goal that carries through all the phases of childhood: education toward freedom. The phrase *education toward freedom* (as well as many aspects of Steiner education) might appear to emphasize a humanitarian and individualistic approach to education. Though such an approach certainly plays a strong role in Steiner education, it would be at best a considerable oversimplification, and at worst downright misleading, to consider this aspect to be overly dominant. We will see in the following part of this essay that to develop freedom in Steiner's sense requires a relationship to *all* of the basic educational approaches articulated above: the acquisition of basic skills and essential information; practical proficiency in a career or vocation; social integration; religious or spiritual awareness; personal development and self-respect; autonomy; and developmental appropriateness – as well as such factors as emotional wholeness and creativity – and that all of these necessarily play a significant role in Steiner education:

> [The child] is helped to reach maturity as a complete, harmoniously
> developed human being. This is the goal that the new art of education
> sets itself. (Spock, 14)

Part II

Modalities of Freedom

'La liberté est un mystère.'[ii]
Malebranche

We use the term freedom to refer to a wide range of fundamentally differing experiences. Naïve consciousness may associate freedom with a lack of outer coercion: I am free when no one tries to prevent me from accomplishing my aims. This interpretation is too restricted in at least three directions, however. First, there are things I am not free to do, not because some human agency prevents me, but because of the nature of the world: I am not free to fly without the aid of mechanical apparatus, to visit the center of the earth, or to live for one thousand years. Second, I may be free to accomplish an act *despite* someone attempting to prevent me from doing so: by overpowering, tricking or avoiding the coercive agency. Third, there are things I may not be free to do for lack of inner resources, either because I am not talented enough or because I lack moral qualities necessary to accomplish them (such as courage, patience or humility).

In the latter case, we see that my own lack of competence or stamina can as effectively limit my freedom to do or accomplish what I want as can external coercion. We experience these different kinds of limitations differently, however: in the former case, I am free to try but not to succeed, while in the latter I am not free to try – but if I manage to circumvent this, I may well still succeed.

In addition, there is a kind of freedom that exists completely independently of my outer situation. Those whose outer freedom has been completely lost have sometimes discovered this, whether this has been through involuntary subjection to a situation of

total outer coercion (e.g., through imprisonment or other confinement) or through voluntary sacrifice, for example, through joining a total institution such as a monastery. Viktor Frankl, whose life was tested to an incredibly severe extent as regards the limits of freedom by his confinement in a concentration camp, regarded this as "the last of the human freedoms: to choose one's attitude in any given set of circumstances, to choose one's own way." (Frankl, 65)

Given the multi-faceted character of such experiences, attempts to reduce freedom to a single essential quality run the danger of foundering. Susan Wolf, a contemporary philosopher who has explored the nature of freedom in great depth, encountered this problem in her work <u>Freedom within Reason</u>. Wolf explores defining freedom in a variety of ways, including: 1) the ability to act in accordance with the dictates of reason; 2) the ability to act in accordance with the true self (identifying the true self with the values held); 3) the ability to act independently of both the dictates of reason and the urges of desires, i.e. arbitrarily (autonomously); and 4) the ability to recognize and act in accordance with reason, as this relates specifically to insight into the True and the Good.[3]

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[3] In this latter exposition, Wolf's use of the term "reason" to mean the recognition of and action in accordance with the True and the Good is somewhat confusing, as she used the same term to describe something very different earlier in her book. In addition, the claim that reason invariably recognizes and only serves Truth and Goodness (her capitals) is doubtful at best, despite her attempts to salvage the situation in her consideration of normative plurality.

Wolf finds exceptions that show the inadequacy of each definition of freedom which she proposes. That she returns in the end to a modality of freedom, reason, which she had already demonstrated to be inadequate illustrates freedom's complexity, and the difficulty in reducing it to a single phenomenon. (Wolf, 1990)

It is possible that freedom is irreducible, however: that it exhibits several modalities, each of which includes phenomena not encompassed by the other(s). This would explain the circularity of Wolf's reasoning. In this case, it would not be by finding the one true answer among the various alternatives posed, but by dynamically encompassing all of the modalities that freedom may be understood.

We will explore this path here. Accepting that freedom is a potentially complex phenomenon, we will explore the modalities in which it appears: freedom regarding my outer existence; freedom regarding my inner life; and the experience of autonomy.

Wolf comes to the conclusion that only "doing the right thing for the right reason" can be considered a free deed, and that Reason is both necessary and sufficient to accomplish this. This is to forget that to err is human – that error occurs even in reasoning humans, even when they are reasoning. Moreover, reason can be used *either* purposefully or accidentally to accomplish aims neither wholly True nor wholly Good in nature. Aside from malicious uses of reason, which show a possible disjunction between reason and the True and the Good, there are certainly also situations in which I do not recognize in *any* of the alternatives available to me a single True and Good course of action, yet where I must exercise what seems very much to be free will. Her exposition does not give a

In exploring these modalities, it becomes quickly apparent that there are broad differences in cultural perceptions here, for in any given culture it seems to be relatively easy to find many examples of expressions of one particular modality of freedom, but relatively difficult to find even a few examples of expressions of the other modalities. No doubt, these cultural differences would be well worth a profounder study. We can define them in summary (and surely oversimplified) fashion as: 1) the Western and modern conception of freedom as outer freedom, 2) the Eastern and ancient conception of freedom as inner freedom, and 3) the European (especially Central European) conception of freedom as autonomy, perhaps placeable chronologically between the ancient and the modern. Exceptions to such cultural classifications abound, of course, and some will appear in the following exposition.

Outer or situational freedom

Liberty to do as I like in the world – outer or situational freedom – has been called

…a conception of freedom that has been central in the tradition of

European individualism and liberalism…[which] refers primarily to a

condition characterized by the absence of coercion or constraint

imposed by another person…by the will of another man, of the state or

any other authority. (Edwards, "Freedom")

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satisfying explanation of why it may well be that my will appears freest in such situations, where not even reason is dictating a clear course of action.

For Hobbes, for example, liberty lies in this: "that [man] finds no stop in doing what he has the will, desire or inclination to do."

> By liberty is understood, according to the proper signification of the
> word, the absence of external impediments; which impediments may
> oft take away part of a man's power to do what he would, but cannot
> hinder him from using the power left him according as his judgment
> and reason shall dictate to him. (Hobbes, Part I, Chapter 14)

Residing as they do in the absence of restraining factors rather than in the existence of contributory or empowering factors, the above are all purely negative conditions of freedom. Even when Western authors emphasize positive elements of freedom, they tend to emphasize the absence of inhibiting external factors, rather than on the inner conditions necessary to achieve these elements:

> This, then, is the appropriate region of human liberty. It comprises,
> first, the inward domain of consciousness, demanding liberty of
> conscience in the most demanding sense; liberty of thought and
> feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects,
> practical or speculative, scientific, moral or theological. The liberty of
> expression…is practically inseparable from it…Secondly, of tastes and
> pursuits, of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character; of
> doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow: without
> impediment from our fellow creatures, even though they should think
> our conduct foolish, perverse or wrong…Thirdly, the liberty of

combination among individuals; freedom to unite, for any purpose not

involving harm to others… (J. S. Mill, 272f)

Even where Mill refers to the "inward domain of consciousness" as essential to freedom, he is exclusively concerned with possible external intrusions upon this domain, rather than fostering its free unfolding from within.

This modality of freedom tends to focus primarily on the external situation in which an individual is placed. Only describing the conditions under which I live, it regards freedom as something essentially unrelated to who I *am*. According to this understanding, to be unfree is perhaps my problem, but a problem whose solution lies in the outer world changing in such a way as to grant me my freedom, rather than in my changing in such a way as to become free.

Thus, attempts to establish outer freedom naturally create demands for changes in the environment. We find examples of this in liberation movements that have focused on throwing off external oppression: the American and French revolutions, or the struggle for civil rights associated with Martin Luther King. When successful, such attempts have often been accompanied by attention to and progress in other modalities of freedom. The civil rights movement is a notable example. In so far as the focus of this movement was on achieving outer changes, rather than achieving inner enlightenment or experiencing autonomy, its emphasis was on attaining outer freedoms. King cultivated a deep inner life, however, and found there many elements of what will be characterized below as inner freedom. In addition, he and the others involved in the struggle for black rights had to develop a great deal of creativity and to exercise a great deal of restraint in the process

of transforming race relationships (King, 1969). Paulo Freire's "*conscientização*" movement also exemplifies this balance:

> Problem-posing education, as a humanist and liberating praxis, posits as fundamental that the people subjected to domination must fight for their emancipation. To that end, it enables teachers and students to become Subjects of the educational process by overcoming authoritarianism and an alienating intellectualism; it also enables people to overcome their false perception of reality. The world – no longer something to be described with deceptive words – becomes the object of that transforming action by men and women which results in their humanization. (Freire, 67)

In this and other cases, the various modalities of freedom can be mutually supportive. At times, however, the struggle for outer freedom has neglected and undervalued freedom's other modalities, for example the inner development of those concerned. The French Revolution is a case in point. Its tragic failure may be at least partly attributed to the excesses resulting from its one-sided approach to freedom: that the individuals leading the outer revolution did not attempt to overcome the negative aspects of their lower selves, in the sense of Eastern philosophy. Attacking the evils of the monarchical system, they ignored evils within themselves which resulted in yet more terrible misuses of power than any king of France ever contemplated.

The focus on external conditions typical of this modality, which can be chiefly found in European thought since the Renaissance, corresponds closely with the focus on

understanding and mastering the outer world characteristic of modern science, also a product of European thought of the last half-millennium. Indeed, modern science is also contributing to liberate mankind from nature's arbitrary sway, and to take her powers into humanity's own hands, and in this sense is a liberation movement in the modern Western tradition. The technological developments of modern times that have given us great control over the outer world, and thus great scope to exercise freedom here, have not stimulated us to pay equal attention to the inner development of those exercising this freedom – ourselves included – and thus also run the danger of being tragically one-sided in this respect.

Inner or constitutional freedom

We can contrast the emphatic emphasis on freedom in the outer situation with attention to what we might call freedom of one's inner situation. From this perspective, the genuine preconditions for freedom can be found in the interior condition of the human being. This is the attitude to freedom that by and large flourished and flourishes in Eastern philosophy and spirituality. Hinduism and Buddhism, for example, attempt to chart a path toward liberation from the inner compulsion of one's own being, toward self-mastery (and Nirvana).

> That disciplined man
>
> with joy and light within,
>
> becomes one with God
>
> and reaches the freedom that is God's.

(Bhagavad Gita 5.24, in Wilson, 379)

Yea, happily he lives, the Brahmin set free,

Whom lusts defile not, who is cooled and loosed from bonds,

Who has all barriers burst, restraining his heart's pain.

Happy the calm one lives who wins peace of mind.

(Anguttara Nikaya i.137, in Wilson, 378)

This state requires an attitude of apartness from or non-involvement with the outer world. The aim is an experience of transcendent freedom or religious ecstasy rather than the immanence of incarnation in or revelation through the outer world of appearances, or Maya. This is thus an interpretation of freedom polar to that of the West. When the two interpretations meet, there is often a lack of mutual understanding:

The means of achieving happiness which are practiced by a Buddhist

monk, which involve a complete concentration upon inner judgments

and evaluations, do not appeal to Americans; indeed they seem

somehow obsolete, if not actually perverse. (Davenport, 106f)

We also find this formulation appearing in Christian mysticism:

Die Welt, die hält dich nicht; du selber bist die Welt

Die dich in dir mit dir so stark gefangen hält.[iii]

(Angelus Silesius, in Hederer, 1957),

European philosophical thought has also expressed this modality of freedom, especially in pre-Renaissance times. Plato described the rational faculty, as opposed to the passionate and appetitive aspects of the soul, as the source of free will (Plato, Republic, bk. 4). Aristotle supports this, and clearly articulated the position that external slavery is just and appropriate when the inner nature has not attained the condition of freedom, which for him lies in the rational mind ruling the soul's passions, just as the soul dominates the body. He thus makes external freedom explicitly dependent upon inner freedom. (Aristotle, Politics, 1253-1254)

This conception of freedom as an essentially interior state can also be found in the writings of Marcus Aurelius:

> It is in your power to live free from compulsion in the greatest tranquility of mind, even if all the world cry out against you as much as they choose, and even if wild beasts tear in pieces the members of this kneaded matter that has grown around you. (Marcus Aurelius, 55)

This is a radical denial of the power of the outer world – even through its power over the physical body – to affect an individual's experience of and potential for freedom, an assertion that freedom solely depends upon an individual's inner being and is only attainable through self-mastery over one's attitudes, reactions and feelings. This point of view wholly places the responsibility for being free upon mastering one's inner condition, independently of the individual's situation in the outer world.

Augustine speaks of "true freedom, which is reserved for those who are happy and who abide by eternal law," a law that is "called the highest reason, which ought

always to be obeyed…" (Augustine, Book I, Chapters 15 and 7). From this point of view, freedom is conformity to necessity; in giving up all subjectivity, true liberation is found:

> No man is free, but he who labors in the Torah. (Mishnah, Abot 6.2,
>
> cited in Wilson, 379)

Kant's universal imperatives also call for subjecting the personal realm to impersonal absolutes which are the source of true freedom. In this sense, he asserts that freedom is independent of the compulsory will of another. (Kant, 1994) And for Schopenhauer, freedom exists as "the surrender and denial of the will to live" which can achieve a state of pure contemplation lifted above all (personal) will. (Mann, 151-7)

Establishing inner freedom creates demands on the inmost self; Gautama Buddha is an example of a person capable of achieving this kind of freedom to an exceptional degree. The prince Siddharta could not achieve enlightenment, however, so long as he was imprisoned in the artificial world – deathless and empty of suffering – that his father had built up around him. For him, and this is perhaps generally the case, achieving inner freedom was contingent upon a certain freedom of outer experience.[4]

At times, the search for inner freedom can undervalue and neglect the outer situation. Cults and fundamentalist movements often stray in this direction, focusing on the inner life to an extreme extent and losing the capacity to master outer conditions of

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[4] There are good reasons for believing that the *achievement* of inner freedom is normally dependent upon having experienced outer freedom, while the later *exercise* of inner freedom may emancipate itself from this condition.

life. One-sidedness in the approach to inner freedom may result in a lack of success in achieving even this modality.

Immanent freedom or autonomy

Between the two above-mentioned approaches to freedom is the experience of that freedom essentially present in the human individuality and manifesting itself in the individuality's acts of becoming, rather than in the outer or inner condition of being. From this point of view, freedom is absolute, and cannot be affected by external *or* internal conditions; it simply belongs to being human. This is the experience of autonomy, as expressed in the inalienable freedom to choose one's path of development, to choose the direction of one's becoming *within* the existential limits set by the world as it is.

> The will is by its nature so free that it can never be constrained.
> (Descartes, I, art. 41.)

> Freedom is precisely the nothingness which is made-to-be at the heart
> of man and which forces human reality to make itself instead of to be.
> … nothing comes to it either from the outside or from within which it
> can receive or accept. Without any help whatsoever, it is abandoned to
> the intolerable necessity of making itself be – down to the slightest
> detail. This freedom is not a being; it is the being of man. (Sartre, 38)

Schiller's <u>Letters on Aesthetic Education</u> approach the free act of becoming in a less introvertedly ascetic manner than does Sartre. Schiller characterizes freedom as the capacity to move playfully between the drives and conditioning factors of natural existence, on the one hand, and the directives of human reason, on the other. Neither obeying the dictates of reason nor acting in accordance with natural impulses provides a path to autonomy. We achieve autonomy, instead, through a dynamic poise between these two worlds. Schiller describes how what is play at an earlier stage of development becomes a dynamic-aesthetic stance in the mature adult, and shows how both of these are experiences of freedom between influences that tend to impinge upon this freedom. (Schiller, n.d.)

Teilhard de Chardin defines freedom as the human capacity, independently of all situational or constitutional fetters, to exercise:

> …creative intuition; in every field it can start from what exists, and
> then act otherwise, do more or better, make some real addition to
> being, and in so doing, itself gain in stature. Here we have a personal
> act, in which the whole ego is involved and rises up into freedom.
> (Rideau, 106)

Similarly, Steiner emphatically asserts that the nature of freedom lies in overcoming both the demands of the outer world, which assert themselves in the form of duty, and the instinctive impulses asserting themselves from within in the form of natural urges. He specifies that true freedom primarily lies neither in that external freedom which is actually an absence of coercion (or other resistance) to my will – the interpretation that

"Frei sein heißt tun können, was man will" [iv] –, nor in inner control over one's own desires – the interpretation that "nach Belieben begehren können und nicht begehren können sei der eigentliche Sinn des Dogmas vom freien Willen." [v] Independent of both of these is the exercise of self-determination in the choice of possible motives for my activity: a capacity for free intuition which draws its inspiration from the realm of pure ideas, yet is capable of acting in the realm of earthly existence (Steiner, 1987, Chapter 9).

> Eine Handlung wird als eine freie empfunden, soweit deren Grund aus
> dem ideellen Teil meines individuellen Wesens hervorgeht; jeder
> andere Teil einer Handlung, gleichgültig, ob er aus dem Zwang der
> Natur oder aus der Nötigung einer sittlichen Norm vollzogen wird,
> wird als <u>unfrei</u> empfunden. [vi]

> Frei ist nur der Mensch, insofern er in jedem Augenblick seines Lebens
> sich selbst zu folgen in der Lage ist. [vii] (Steiner, 1987, 169)

> Frei sein heißt die dem Handeln zugrunde liegenden Vorstellungen
> (Beweggründe) durch die moralische Phantasie von sich aus
> bestimmen können. [viii] (Ibid, 202)

Such descriptions of autonomy provide strongly positive descriptions of freedom. From this point of view, freedom depends neither upon the individual's situation in the outer world, nor the condition of his or her inner or natural being, but rather upon the capacity to maintain, in relation to both of these factors which are not my true self, a state of becoming (Sartre), aesthetic playfulness (Schiller), creative invention (Teilhard de Chardin) or free intuition (Steiner) – the capacity to explore both the inner world and the

outer world without allowing either to act in a determining fashion on the human being's autonomous nature. That this is by no means an abstract definition becomes apparent when freedom is put to an existential test, as in the above-mentioned case of Viktor Frankl.

Though the *existence* of genuine autonomy does not depend upon the individual's inner or outer situation, the *exercise* of autonomy can only take place in connection with these. Creative freedom requires a content as well as a source, and this content cannot be found in the formally active but substantively empty individuality of the actor. To be exercised, rather than merely potential, autonomy thus demands a relationship to some aspect of the surrounding and/or interior world. Through these relationships, it connects us to the concrete content of the realms between which our existence is framed, as both Schiller and Steiner emphasize.

A focus on autonomy as the essence of freedom can also become one-sided, however. By exclusively living out of playfulness and/or autonomous creativity, an individual can easily neglect both practical relationships to the outer world and his or her inner development; both the artist and the tyrant are at risk here. Nero fiddled while Rome burned.

The Dynamic of Freedom

Zwei Seelen wohnen, ach! in meiner Brust,

Die eine will sich von der andern trennen:

Die eine hält in derber Liebeslust

Sich an die Welt mit klammernden Organen;

Die andre hebt gewaltsam sich vom Dust

Zu den Gefilden hoher Ahnen.[ix]

J. W. Goethe, Faust

We may group the various images of freedom presented above into three broad categories:

1) Conformity to a higher principle – to reason, eternal law, God, or the True and the Good. Here, freedom is found in obedience to an absolute and objective order, an obedience that requires that I overcome or sacrifice 'mere' subjectivity. It may well be true in a higher sense that personal freedom reaches its culmination in voluntary sacrificing itself. However, this cannot explain the source of the very freedom that I can sacrifice.

2) The ability to act as I desire. Here, freedom is found in the unimpeded fulfillment of my desires. This is perhaps a necessary condition of freedom, for if I cannot act as I desire I am surely in some sense unfree. It is hardly a sufficient condition, however. If I can only act as my desires dictate, I am equally surely unfree.

3) The ability to choose among various actions, or among various motives for my actions. Here, freedom is found in the existence of the choice independently of the nature of the alternatives. This neglects the question of how I become aware of possible courses of action, or of my motives. Freedom must surely include the extent to which various possible motives or courses of action are available to me. Though, in the case of a reduced selection, I may not notice the absence of the missing alternatives, and thus may *feel* myself to be a fully free agent, we can nevertheless surely speak of an increase in freedom – in the freedom of choice, at the very least – when a greater range of motives or actions is available.

It appears that no single explanation suffices to explain the full breadth of freedom's manifestations. This is not necessarily incompatible with there being one essential phenomenon behind all of these manifestations. For example, light, also essentially a single phenomenon, manifests at times in a wave-like and at times in a particle-like manner. Like light, freedom's manifestations seem not to be reducible to a single explanation.

The difference between light and freedom in this respect is that we do not ourselves engender light. We can only view light from the point of view of external observers. We are ourselves the engenderers of our freedom, however. By attending to what is happening in our own consciousness while we engender freedom, we can examine freedom from within, as it were: in the subjective act of its creation, as a moral event, and not just in its achieved condition. In his <u>Philosophy of Freedom,</u> Steiner describes our psychological, inward experience of freedom from this subjective point of

view. He begins by describing this experience as a single, integrated movement of consciousness, and then proceeds to articulate this experience into stages that correspond closely to the three modalities articulated above.

For Steiner, freedom arises out of autonomous intuition. This intuition is a creative act that does not simply stem from the immediacy of the urges or desires of the natural organism. Nor does it simply echo the rational consciousness's ideas and principles, which are necessarily abstract and general. Intuition is only possible when we find a source within us independent of both ideal-abstract reason and real-concrete desires: the autonomous realm of our being that has been cited above as one of the central pillars of freedom.

Though pure becoming, and thus not dependent upon these two realms of being, (the rational and the immediate) for its existence, the free intuition draws upon and thus links these realms in a unique way. It does this by generating an impulse that contains an ideal adapted to the concrete practical situation: individually determined, ideal in its nature yet real in its configuration. This requires some explanation.

We draw the ideal intentionality that defines the content of a free intuition from the inner world of concepts and ideas, which Steiner calls the moral idea trove (*moralisches Ideenvermögen*).[5] In the next stage, we transform this generalized

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[5] Using the word 'moral' to refer to ideas, imagination, technique and intuition may appear confusing to some readers. It is retained here because it seems significant in Steiner's vocabulary, wherein it may be understood as referring to a connection between ideal intentions and practical actions. Since this usage corresponds reasonably closely to

conception or ideal into a specific intention through an imaginative act, which Steiner calls the moral imagination. In order to realize this intention, we must effectively apply it in the realm in which we wish to act; this requires an understanding of the principles underlying this realm. Steiner calls this moral technique (Steiner, 1987, Chap. XII, especially 193f). Freedom manifests in the interplay of these three factors, the moral idea trove, moral imagination and moral technique.

Steiner describes how a person may have little capacity to generate new intuitions, due to a poverty of ideas or lack of imagination, but may nevertheless be extremely capable of translating (others') ideas into practice, or, on the contrary, have a rich supply of ideas but be poor at translating these into the real world. The three moral faculties are thus truly distinct and independent, linked by the intuition that combines all three in the true deed of freedom. (Ibid.)

From this point of view, freedom does not merely depend upon the human being possessing a morally autonomous individuality; it is more than an unavoidable and absolute aspect of the human condition. Freedom is a potential that has prerequisites for its fulfillment. It arises; it develops; it is never complete and finished.

Education does not need to provide a person with a morally autonomous individuality. Sartre is right to assert that the autonomy wherein the *potential* for freedom lies is an essential part of being human. However, education *can* work to provide or nurture prerequisites upon which the individuality's capacity to *realize* this potential

our normal understanding of the term, it is probably the attribution of moral qualities to particular moments of this connection that generates the confusion.

depends. It can develop the moral ideas, moral imagination and moral technique without which freedom is merely an empty phrase or unrealized potential. Attention to these prerequisites is integral to achieving the goal of nurturing free individualities.

It may be that educators can work without reference to freedom, yet nevertheless be effective in establishing some or all of the prerequisites upon which freedom depends. In this case, it is left to the individual or to other influences to establish the link between the capacities nurtured and the autonomous individuality, the free subject.

It may also be that educators may have the intention of developing free individualities, yet not attend to or develop the above prerequisites upon which an effective *exercise* of freedom depends. In this case, it is left to the individual or to other influences to establish these prerequisites through which the developed potential for freedom can first be adequately exercised.

Any educational setting is likely to be only partially successful at accomplishing any of the aims considered in this section. But if becoming a free individuality in the comprehensive sense developed in this essay is the true aim of the developing human being, and if education is there to nurture that end, then both developing the potential and providing the tools for its exercise are integral parts of that task.

Part III

Education toward Freedom

These things shall be! A loftier race
Than e'er the world hath known shall rise,
With flame of freedom in their souls,
And light of knowledge in their eyes.

John Addington Symonds

The three modalities of freedom described above – outer freedom, autonomy and inner freedom – all describe freedom from an objective point of view. As mentioned in the introduction, the danger of this point of view is that it reifies freedom, rather than adequately describing its reality as a creative process.

If freedom is more accurately and adequately described in terms of creative processes than in terms of static conditions, this would explain why we normally attribute freedom to the human being alone, in a way that freedom as an absence of outer resistance to what is willed does not. In this case, we may wish to choose the psychological moments of moral technique, moral imagination and moral ideas as designates for freedom's modalities. As we will see below, these three psychological moments broadly correspond to freedom's three modalities in a way that allows us to find both objective and subjective reference points.

In addition, both the child's internal condition and external situation can be expected to radically change between the years of schooling and those of the mature adult who is in a position to make use of the fruits of those years, while the third modality of

freedom, autonomy, is still but nascent in childhood. Thus, a focus on stimulating creative processes, rather than on creating freedom as situational conditions, seems especially appropriate in the context of education.

For both of these reasons, as we now proceed to explore the consequences for education of the expanded viewpoint of freedom presented above, processual descriptions of freedom's defining moments will serve as our starting points.

Some of the aims of education articulated in the first part of this essay have obvious relations to the defining moments of freedom; others may require some explanation to comprehend their relationships to freedom as a developmental goal. When the above articulated, expanded image of freedom serves as its leitmotiv, education is given a rather comprehensive mandate. In addition, many educational aims will gain new depth when placed in this context.

This essay can only explore the question of how education can support the development of freedom in its various aspects in a broad and summary way. If a consciousness of freedom as the overall goal of pedagogy, indeed as the developmental goal of childhood itself, is to penetrate every detail of education – the curriculum, methodology of teaching and comprehension of child development – a great deal of further work will have to be done.[6]

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[6] Cf. the author's *At the Source: Educating the Incarnating Child*, unpublished manuscript.

Moral technique

Practical capacities are necessary in order to realize moral intentions in the outer world. Moral technique, which is dependent upon the cultivation of such capacities, is thus most strongly connected with achieving outer freedom.

> Um ein bestimmtes Wahrnehmungsobjekt oder eine Summe von solchen, einer moralischen Vorstellung gemäß, umbilden zu können, muß man den gesetzmäßigen Inhalt (die bisherige Wirkungsweise, die man neu gestalten oder der man eine neue Richtung geben will) dieses Wahrnehmungsbildes begriffen haben. Man muß ferner den Modus finden, nach dem sich diese Gesetzmäßigkeit in eine neue verwandeln läßt. Dieser Teil der moralischen Wirksamkeit beruht auf Kenntnis der Erscheinungswelt, mit der man es zu tun hat. Er ist also zu suchen in einem Zweige der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis überhaupt.[x] (Steiner, 1987, 193f)

> Ob ich tun, das heißt, in Wirklichkeit umsetzen kann, was ich will, was ich mir also als Idee meines Tuns vorgesetzt habe, das hängt von äußeren Umständen und von meiner technischen Geschicklichkeit ab.[xi] (Steiner, 1987, 202)

As Steiner mentions here, outer circumstances must be favorable for intentions to succeed. Education cannot directly control or affect the outer circumstances in which the individual will one day live and work, however. What it can do is aid the practical realization of intentions by developing various kinds of capacities: those employed

directly in shaping the outer world, or craftsmanship; those needed to comprehend the laws of the world, or science; and those by which we put scientific principles into effect, or technology.

Moral technique embraces competencies in all the realms in which we act. The world of nature is one possible object of intentions, but intentions and intuitions may also relate to other elements of the world, such as social life, where, understanding of our fellow human beings, not natural science, is the prerequisite to practical success. This is particularly true in education, where it is our understanding of children in general, and of the particular children before us, that enables us to take effective action.

The traditional basics of education, skills development and fundamental knowledge, clearly serve in many ways as supports for the attainment of practical ends. From the point of view of education toward outer freedom, such capacities are thus vital to develop. In this context, they are not ends in themselves, however, but are developed as resources that an individual may gain mastery over the world in which she lives. From this point of view, we do not learn rules of arithmetic, skills of building and social etiquette because being able to calculate, to build and to be socially acceptable are in themselves ultimate objectives of learning, but because these skills may allow us to become more capable of translating our free intentions into real deeds. In this light, career training, social integration, civics and religious education appear as valid, yet narrowly conceived objectives. They receive a fuller context when encompassed within larger mandates: comprehending the worlds within which we live; developing craftsmanship to shape the various aspects of these worlds; and establishing the technical expertise necessary to use the laws of these worlds to effect our intentions. This viewpoint offers a

new dimension to the teaching of basic skills and knowledge; it allows us to look at these as vehicles for the individuality's free intentions. By looking through the former, the work on skills and acquisition of knowledge, for revelations of the latter, the individual's intentions, the teacher can find a deeper background for and relationship to the pedagogical work.

It is against this backdrop, incidentally, that we can evaluate educational testing. If testing continually directs pedagogical activity back upon the content as a fixed end in itself rather than allowing the subject matter to serve the liberating potential of learning, then educational testing may be undermining the potential of schools to cultivate free individuals, rather than enhancing this potential. On the other hand, if testing is used to ensure that skills to translate free intentions into their practical realization are established, then educational testing may exist in harmony with the ideal of education toward freedom.

There is another consideration that is relevant to the realm of moral technique. The conventional Western interpretation of freedom as an absence of outer restriction can easily lead to members of this society experiencing all externally imposed forms, including traditional economic, social and religious structures, as limitations on freedom. This has been apparent in the phenomenon of the seeker who rejects conventional limitations, including conventional careers, authority structures and forms of worship: the heretic, bum, bohemian or hippy. Including moral technique as an aspect of freedom offers the alternative of viewing society's conventional structures as means to accomplish the larger intentions of the human being. Thereby, freely chosen intentions can manifest

through work, hierarchical structures and social and religious engagement, rather than *despite* these.

Moral intentions are in no way limited to being transitory in impulse and effect. Some intentions may require an entire lifetime to be fulfilled; indeed, even a lifetime may be inadequate for this. We can interpret career and economic success, social integration and moral or religious standing as often vital and generally important tools in achieving larger goals. Autonomous intuition can remain primary in determining the intentional direction, yet capabilities to establish a career and attain economic ends, to play an effective role in social and political life, and to orient oneself within a religious foundation still be justifiable goals of education toward freedom. If it is to provide a basis for outer freedom, education must also attend to the establishment of these elements within the context of providing paths for the realization of the free individual's autonomous intentions.

Moral ideas

The capacity for moral ideas connects most strongly with what has been described above as inner freedom.

> Frei sein heißt die dem Handeln zugrunde liegenden Vorstellungen (Beweggründe) durch die moralische Phantasie von sich aus bestimmen können....Sich vorschreiben zu lassen, was er tun *soll*, das ist, zu wollen, was ein andrer und nicht er für richtig hält, dazu ist er nur zu haben, insofern er sich nicht <u>frei</u> fühlt.[xii] (Steiner, 1987, 202)

Moral intentions have their origin in the subject's inner life, more particularly, in the body of concepts, ideas and ideals that have been built up in the course of a lifetime. These must be established before they can be drawn on and translated into intentions.

> [Der freie Geist] hat rein ideelle Gründe, die ihn bewegen, aus der Summe seiner Begriffe gerade einen bestimmten herauszuheben und inh in Handlung umzusetzen.[xiii] (Steiner, 1987, 191)

The breadth of the palette of potential intentions also determines the extent to which inner freedom may be realized. The narrower or less cultivated mind will be able to draw upon a narrower range of concepts and ideas, the broader and more cultivated mind a greater range. Herein lies a great justification for learning for learning's sake: that of extending the range of motivating intentions, the moral idea trove. Without this, freedom is restricted to the technique of executing other's ideas. (*Ibid.*)

Developing the inner life entails cultivating the individual's intellectual, moral, religious and spiritual nature in the broadest sense. This might include experiences of lived ideals, a deepening in the developmental history of humanity's inner life, and introductions to those who have realized their own inner purposes, and to those great individuals who have renewed humanity's relationship to the inner life – founders of religions, leaders of spiritual, religious or idealistic movements. These and other themes, along with the expansion of intellectual and imaginative faculties mentioned above, may serve to provide a basis for expanding the pupil's own range of moral ideas.

Providing the basis necessary for a genuine and fulfilling inner life thus becomes a central pedagogical task. Capacities of abstract reasoning, logic and analytical thinking

provide one side of this basis, the side most often cultivated in traditional education. However, abstraction alone can only reduce the content of the inner life from the rich sensory impressions of the outer world to the bare bones of the common elements between these. In contrast, capacities of synthetic or inferential reasoning, imagination and metaphorical thinking develop new richness of content; this is a side of the inner life often neglected in modern education.

In order for intuitions to manifest as concrete intentions, however, the body's organic activity – which otherwise asserts its mastery over my intentions – must make place for these:

> …die Berechtigung, ein Wollen als frei zu bezeichnen, durch das
> Erlebnis erreicht wird: in dem Wollen verwirklicht sich eine ideele
> Intuition.... Ist eine solche Intuition im menschlichen Bewußtsein
> anwesend, dann ist sie nicht aus den Vorgängen des Organismus heraus
> entwickelt, sondern die organische Tätigkeit hat sich zurückgezogen,
> um der ideelen Platz zu machen.[xiv] (Steiner, 1987, 203-4)

Such a mastery of the natural impulses implies shaping the physical body, habits and memory and character and soul life so that these do not present impediments to, but rather serve as functional and expressive organs of the individual's higher intentions. In this sense, the pedagogical task includes all that strengthens, clarifies, remedies the deficiencies in or broadens the capabilities of any of these aspects of the human being – indeed, all that builds emotional balance, cultivates focus and establishes discipline.

Education will train the physical body, foster good habits and build character (Carlgren, 203).

These are significant pedagogical tasks, tasks whose significance takes on an enhanced stature when they are seen not as training to be imposed, but as tools through which the individual can achieve inner freedom.

Autonomy

Moral imagination connects with flexibility, playfulness in Schiller's sense, creativity and self-expression, all aspects of what has been called immanent freedom or autonomy above. It is possible to exercise these faculties in every realm of life, but there is a particular realm that especially intensively nurtures creativity, playfulness and self-expression: the arts. We play music, put on a play in drama, and in the rest of the arts, as well, the role played by improvisation, experimentation and self-expression looms large. It seems natural, then, for the arts to play a correspondingly large role in education toward autonomy. There is, of course, an intrinsic value in an artistic training, as well, aside from the significance of this for the development of autonomy. In the context of freedom as a pedagogical aim, however, artistic work also serves the larger purpose of developing facility in transforming principles, ideas and ideals – moral intuitions – into concrete, situationally appropriate intentions.

There is another, significant aspect of autonomy. Self-expression manifests both through achieving one's potential in small things and through realizing larger purposes in life. To do justice to this aspect of autonomy, those responsible for education must recognize that each individual is the bearer of a unique self and, correspondingly, a unique destiny, through which this self can achieve fulfillment. Though this self, as we

have seen, is not yet manifested in childhood, to foster creativity, playfulness, self-expression and flexibility is in fact to exercise the nascent self's integration into the personality as a whole and facility to make use of the conditions in which it will be born. Once again, this approach casts new light on conventional aims. Regarding self-fulfillment and self-expression in the light of larger ends – as tools useful in the service of realizing the as yet inarticulate self's future intentions – can transform our whole approach to the particular achievements themselves.

Social life calls for these qualities especially strongly, whereby Steiner's hope is particularly relevant:

> …[the] social order will always be alive with that which each fully developed individual brings with him into life, rather than that each succeeding generation is made to conform to the existing social organization. (Steiner, cit. in Carlgren, 203)

This approach applies to areas other than social life, as well: for example, to career and cultural achievement. Here, too, there is a difference between trying to educate people to be employable or cultured – to educate conformity to what has been established in these spheres – and working to educate individuals capable of making a contribution to the sphere of their profession and to cultural life. As in social life, where a contribution may take place at the level of family, friends and colleagues, or at the larger level of the larger society, country or world affairs, so professional and cultural contributions may take place at many levels. There have been countless recent attempts to transform corporate life to mobilize this potential, often known as employee initiative programs.

This counters the split between the trained professionals who manage and the experienced workers who execute the work by providing opportunities for employees at all levels to contribute to the on-going development of an organization. In a world which leaves ever less room for the amateur between the highly trained professional and the consumer of cultural goods, it is especially important to nurture this in the cultural life as well.

Genuine autonomy, as we have seen above, differs radically from freedom from coercive influences, for the latter relates to our outer freedom, not our autonomous self. Establishing the developing child's autonomy in a given sphere of life is thus not merely a matter of removing external controls and guidance in this sphere. Something positive must arise from within the child's being to take the latter's stead.

In order for the responsibility for a given sphere of human existence to be handed over to the individual's autonomous control, rather than merely released from external guidance, the individual must develop a certain relationship to that sphere. Indeed, if this is to take place in a way that allows for the creativity and playfulness that we have seen are prerequisites to autonomy, there must be a relationship of the self to both bordering worlds: to the concrete outer factors that play a determining role in that sphere and to the motivating impulses or intentions that relate to the latter. The progress of autonomy is thus characterized by the developing capacity of the growing human being to build such relationships to successive spheres of human life. That this necessarily takes place in an incremental manner is apparent when we consider that a two-year old child may have a relationship to intention and realization in building a tower of blocks; an eleven-year old in maintaining a friendship; a nineteen-year old in comprehending a period of history.

Researchers in education and educators devote a great deal of effort to defining these stages and attempting to meet the child's developing capacities at appropriate times. There nevertheless remains much ambiguity about and dissension over the appropriate times to encourage children's relationship to various spheres of life. Much depends upon what the teacher wants to achieve.

A child may be able to grasp some aspects of the world conceptually before she can effectively accomplish a great deal in these areas; this tends to be true of more theoretical or academic subjects. A five-year old can be brought to keep a diary, but the content is likely to miss the point of what we usually intend by this. A child who is encouraged to enter such realms prematurely tends to lean upon set models which conceal a lack of real connection to or understanding of the subject matter. In contrast, a great deal can be accomplished practically in certain areas before the child really begins to have independent intentions in these spheres; this tends to be true in both moral development and technology. Good habits can be built at quite an early age; so can complex technical models; for their accomplishment, both require external instructions to be precisely followed, for the very reason that a real connection to or understanding of the higher meaning behind both of these is beyond the younger child.

If one of the goals of education is to develop autonomy, then the appropriate point to give a realm of existence over to the responsibility of the developing child is when, in that realm, both intention and realization can be explored in a creative and playful manner. The educative agency will thus bear the responsibility of nurturing such playful, creative relationships and explorations in the transition period before such a handing over takes place. The child's ability both to develop intentions and to realize accomplishments

in the given realm is normally the signal that an autonomous stance is possible here, and thus that external guidance and stimulation may progressively withdraw to leave a free space for the child's development here.

At every stage of development, there will thus be areas in which the child is not yet competent, areas of developing competency that are being prepared, areas of established competencies that are in the process of being handed over to the child, and areas in which the child's autonomy is already recognized. This is not the place to pursue the details of how these developmental stages unfold, or of the possible pedagogical responses. It is enough here to show that (and how) education toward freedom offers the possibility of meaningfully defining these stages, and of articulating appropriate responses to them.

Conclusion

This essay set out to explore the nature of education in the light of its traditional aims, the nature of freedom, and the consequences of establishing freedom as a central pedagogical goal. By encompassing freedom's full range rather than attempting to reduce it to a single one of its aspects, and by exploring freedom as a subjectively created event, education toward freedom gains a complex profile that embraces the entire range of the aims generally put forward for education. In addition, it broadens and enriches these aims in pedagogically relevant ways by providing new contexts for them.

Freedom in the outer world implies *competency*; a craftsman is free with his material when he can form it into what he wants to achieve with it. Freedom in the inner realm implies *self-mastery*; we are free in our inner life when we have developed capacities of thought and imagination and can employ these effectively. Freedom of self implies *autonomy*; the ego is free when it can both *determine* its own intentions by distinguishing these from influences from both the outer world and the soul realm, and *achieve* its intentions by actively and deeply engaging with both of these realms.

Competency, self-mastery and autonomy are thus both aspects of and requisites for freedom. They form the pillars upon which an education aiming at developing free individuals can stand.

This study began with the observation that freedom can be considered as an activity rather than as a condition. Education toward freedom aims to stimulate this

activity. In order to accomplish this, it is necessary to provide not merely a *situation* of freedom that reduces to an absence of outer restraint, but rather the various preconditions under which the child's free existence can bud and blossom. That the young, developing human beings are agents who will eventually be wholly responsible for their own free development implies that there will be an increasingly active contribution from the children themselves to their own freedom. Indeed, the developmental process manifests in this very activity on the part of the children, as the move from being passive recipients of to become active contributors to the educational experience.

Schools have the potential to nourish competence, autonomy and creativity in the participants by encouraging their active participation in the developmental process. It lies in the nature of genuine freedom that this demands a great deal of all concerned, whether teachers, parents, children or simply members of the surrounding community.

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Translations of Quotations

(All translations are by the author unless otherwise noted.)

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[i] In order to speak of human freedom, we must look to this autonomous aspect of the human being, pure, sense-free thinking, in which the will always lives as well.

[ii] Liberty is a mystery.

[iii] The world holds you not: you are yourself the world

That you in you with you so hard-imprisoned holds.

[iv] To be free is to be able to do what one wants

[v] The true meaning of the dogma of free will is to be able to desire and not-desire at will.

[vi] A deed is experienced as free in so far as its motivation arises out of the spiritual part of my individuality; every other aspect of a deed, whether executed due to natural compulsion or under the coercion of an ethical norm, is experienced as unfree.

[vii] A human being is only free when able to be true to himself (lit.: follow himself) in every moment of life.

[viii] To be free is to oneself determine through moral imagination the ideas (motivations) that underlie one's action.

[ix] Two souls alas! are dwelling in my breast;

And each is fain to leave its brother.

The one, fast clinging, to the world adheres

With clutching organs, in love's sturdy lust;

The other strongly lifts itself from dust

To yonder high, ancestral spheres.   (Translated by George Madison Priest.)

[x] In order to be able to transform a particular object of perception – or a collection of such objects – according to a moral imagination, the principles (the mode of action which one wishes to modify or to which one wishes to give a new direction) of what is perceived must first be understood. Beyond this, a mode must be discovered through which this ordered structure may be transformed into a new structure. This part of moral effectiveness depends upon knowledge of the relevant world of appearances, and thus is to be looked for in a branch of scientific understanding in general.

[xi] If I do – that is, can practically effect – what I want to, what I have chosen to be the principle of my activity depends upon both outer circumstances and my technical ability.

[xii] To be free is oneself to determine through moral imagination the ideas (motivations) that underlie one's action….In order for someone to allow another person to prescribe what he should do – in order for a person to strive after what another, and not he himself, believes to be right – he must first feel himself to be unfree.

[xiii] [A free spirit] has purely ideal motives that motivate choosing a particular concept from all the available ones, and then translating this into action.

[xiv] The justification to call an act of will free is arrived at through the experience that a spiritual intuition is manifesting in this act of will. If such an intuition is present in human consciousness, then it does not derive from the organic processes; the organic activity has rather retreated to allow space for the spiritual activity.